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INTRODUCTION

"Sorry I'm late; I'm on Latin time." Although Latin Americans use this expression as a lighthearted excuse for tardiness, it
derives from a very real social phenomenon that persists throughout contemporary Latin America. Indeed, anthropologists
acknowledge that perception of time varies sharply across cultures. In 1983, anthropologist and intercultural researcher Dr.
Edward Hall coined terms describing two distinct ways in which
societies organize time:'
(1) Monochronism refers to a linear time system in which peo*J.D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 2006, University of
Southern California. Self-professed polychronist. I would like to thank Professor
David Abraham of the University of Miami School of Law for his guidance and wealth
of knowledge about this topic.
1. EDWARD T. HALL, THE DANCE OF LIFE: THE OTHER DIMENSION OF TIME (Sally
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pie engage in one activity at a time.' The system originated in
Northern Europe, and is characteristic of Anglo cultures.' It is
task-oriented, and controlled by rigid, formal schedules.' In contrast, (2) polychronism stems from the Mediterranean model of
simultaneous involvement in several activities .5 It is characteristic of Latino and Middle Eastern cultures. Polychronic time is
people-oriented,6 and punctuality and deadlines are less important in polychronic societies.'
The study of monochronic and polychronic time in relation to
legal practices could shed light on deficiencies in Latin American
judicial processes and institutions. This article explores those
deficiencies and their connection to polychronism, which is
engrained in Latin American societies. This article first considers
Max Weber's theory of the Protestant work ethic, in which
monochronism plays a major role. It then addresses criticisms
about the causes of Latin American economic and institutional
failure, indicating that such criticism ignores the cultural prominence of polychronism. Thereafter, this article provides a more
comprehensive discussion of the anthropological concepts of
monochronic and polychronic time, principally using the observations, research, and studies of Edward Hall.
After having laid the anthropological foundation necessary to
understand polychronism, this article describes the current, major
challenges facing the judiciary in Latin America: corruption and
inefficiency. It then describes how polychronism likely contributes to each of those challenges. Next, this article explores the
concept of "rhythm," and how it, too, might play a significant role
in citizen inertia and judicial inefficiency. This article concludes
by contending that reforming time systems could lead to improved
judicial efficacy in Latin America.
II.

THE WEBER THESIS

In 1913, inspired by Benjamin Franklin's contention that
"time is money," German economist and sociologist Max Weber
Arteseros ed., Anchor Books, Doubleday 1984). Hall is also a consultant to business
and government. Id.
2. Id. at 46.
3. Id.
4. See generally id. at 44-58.
5. Id. at 46.
6. Id.
7. Id. For a more detailed discussion of monochronic and polychronic societies,
cultural context, and group behavior in polychronic organizations, see infra Part 111.

20091

2009]
MRANA, MARANA10

107

wrote The ProtestantEthic and The Spirit of Capitalism,"in which
he theorized that through the Reformation, Protestantism
instilled in its followers a work ethic that would influence the
development of capitalism. 9 That work ethic, or "spirit of capitalism," led to economic prosperity and industrialization in Protestant nations, notwithstanding the decline of its religious
underpinnings.' 0
According to Weber, Protestants believed that labor was a
spiritual duty."' "The effect of the Reformation .. . was only that,
as compared with the Catholic attitude, the moral emphasis on
and the religious sanction on, organized worldly labour in a calling was mightily increased."" Pursuant to Weber's theory, Calvinism and other Puritan sects imposed upon their followers a
religious and moral duty, i.e., a "calling," to work."3 That calling
bred "ascetic conduct [which] meant a rational planning of the
whole of one's life in accordance with God's will.""
Ascetic labor, of course, is inextricably intertwined with time.
Indeed, Puritan leaders such as the seventeenth century's Richard
Baxter encouraged their followers to "use every minute of [time]
as a most precious thing, and spend it wholly in the way of duty.""
They offered "each man his own interior moral time-piece. "" Such
teachings embodied the concept of monochronism, though the
anthropological term for the concept would not be born until hundreds of years after the Reformation, and decades after Weber
published his thesis.
A.

The Weber Thesis as Applied to Latin America

Relying in large part on Weber's theory, Lawrence Harrison
in his book The Pan-American Dream attributes Latin America's
8.

MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CA.PiTALISM

(Talcott

Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1913).
9. See generally id.
10. See generally id. In other words, although the spiritual influence of
Protestantism may have declined since the Reformation, the practical effect of the
Protestant work ethic is believed to persist even among non-religious individuals.
11. DIRK KASLER & MAX WEBER: AN INTRODUCTION To His LIFE AND WORK 83
(Philippa Hurd trans., The University of Chicago Press 1988).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 79.
14. Id. at 153.
15. E. P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST
AND PRESENT 56, 87 (1967) (quoting RICHARD BAXTER, A CHRISTIAN DIRECTORY, OR, A
BODY OF PRACTICAL DIVINITY AxND CASES OF CONSCIENCE (London 1673) (1664)).
16. Id. at 87; see also Hall, supra note 1, at 72 (observing that "[ilnternal controls
are much more binding than the external ones because you are your own tyrant").

108

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

economic and institutional failure to its Ibero-Catholic roots."
(Whereas Anglo societies embraced Protestantism, Latin America
was colonized by the Spanish and Portuguese, who brought
Catholicism to the New World."8 ) He describes the Ibero-Catholic
culture-and accordingly, contemporary Latin America-as nothing short of impulsive, lazy, wasteful, improvident, and unethical.'" The study of polychronic time, however, could provide a
simpler (and less hasty) explanation for many of the institutional
shortcomings that Harrison addresses.
To be fair, Harrison's argument is not wholly without merit,
where studies show a direct correlation among Protestantism,
work ethic, and economic success. 0 However, Hall's anthropological revelations about time suggest a route that Harrison left unexplored. Admittedly, polychronism may prove troublesome in
certain institutions, such as the judiciary.2 ' In other areas, however, it proves exceptionally beneficial. 2 Notably, what Harrison
overlooks is "how deeply [polychronic time] affect [s] the channeling and flow of information, the shape and form of the networks
connecting people, and a host of other important social and cultural features of the society."" Perhaps time plays a more pivotal
role in shaping Latin America's political and institutional culture
17.

LAWRENCE

HARRISON,

THE

PAN-AMERICA

DREAM:

Do

LATIN

AMERICA'S

CULTURAL VALUES DISCOURAGE TRUE PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA?

24 (Basic Books 1997).

18. See generally id.
19. Harrison puts it this way: "That [Ibero-Catholic] culture focuses on the present
and past at the expense of the future; it focuses on the individual and the family at
the expense of the broader society; it nurtures authoritarianism; it propagates a
flexible ethical code; it enshrines orthodoxy; and it is disdainful of work, creativity,
and saving." Id. at 24.
20. See Emilio Willems, Cultural Change and the Rise of the Protestantism in

Brazil and Chile, in

THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND MODERNIZATION: A COMPARATIvE
VIEW 190, 197 (S. N. Eisenstadt ed., 1968). Willems conducted empirical studies that

showed that increased growth rates of Protestantism in Brazil and Chile ran parallel
to the change in the traditional social structure. "This change consists primarily of
slow disintegration of the feudalistic agrarian structure, the settlement of new
agricultural lands, the urbanization and industrialization of some regions, as well as
the development of a new class structure." Furthermore, "field data indicate that in
many communities Protestants have gained the reputation among non-Protestants of
being especially reliable, conscientious, and industrious." Id. at 197.
21. See infra, Part LV-V.
22. For example, Hall conducted extensive studies revealing that polychronic
individuals-particularly Hispanics and "ethnic blacks"-are disproportionately more
in tune with others' rhythms, emotions, and moods. See generally Hall, supra note 1,
at 153-76. He also observed that "friendship takes a long time to develop" in
polychronic cultures. Id. at 65.
23. Id. at 45.
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than contemplated by Harrison. Perhaps time is so internalizedso engrained in individuals' very being-that it permeates the
region's most important institutions.
That poses a problem for economic development, because,
pursuant to Weber-like theses, industrialism is invariably intertwined with monochronic time. "Mature industrial societies of all
varieties are marked by time-thrift and by a clear demarcation
between 'work' and 'life."' 12 Indeed, "without schedules or something similar to the [monochronic] -time system, it is doubtful that

our industrial civilization could have developed as it has.

2

'

Does

this present a conflict? Can culturally engrained polychronic time
be reconciled with economic prosperity, and moreover, an efficient
judiciary?
III.

MONOGHRONic TIME VERSUS POLYCHRONIC TIME:
A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW

"[Monochronic time] is . .. tangible; we speak of it as being
saved, spent, wasted, lost, made up, crawling, killed, and running
out."126

As such, monochronic cultures are schedule-dominated in

terms of both professional and personal activities. Monochronic
individuals concentrate on one thing at a time, scheduling more
important tasks first and allotting them more time." They take
deadlines seriously, and view failure to meet such deadlines as
egocentric and rude. Moreover, in monochronic cultures, one or
two people often are sealed off from a larger group.2 " On the other
hand, polychronic individuals "interact with several people at once
and are continually involved with each other. Tight scheduling is
therefore difficult, if not impossible."" As a result, people are
inevitably late or fail to show up. Hall directly addressed how
polychronic individuals respond to their peers' tardiness:
The individual waiting is not upset because there are so
many things going on that it usually doesn't matter that
much. Besides, being kept waiting is not read as a slap in
the face. The schedule is something that is outside and is
not linked to either the ego or the superego as it is for those
reared in North European cultures. Being late is not a
24. Thompson, supra note 15, at 93.
25. Hall, supra note 1, at 48.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 49. For an analysis on how this observation influences Hall's theory on
structural organization, see discussion infra Part III.B.
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message nor is it taken personally. 30
Moreover, whereas monochronic cultures are process-oriented, "polychronic individuals are oriented toward people,
human relationships, and the family, which is the core of their
existence. Family takes precedence over everything else. Close
friends come next. In the absence of schedules, when there is a
3
crisis, the family always comes first."1'
Divergent attitudes toward time can cause monochronic and
polychronic people to clash. Hall illustrated this tension with a
mundane example: a monochronic client schedules an appointment with her polychronic hairdresser. Subsequently, the hairdresser's relative or friend asks to be squeezed in. The
hairdresser complies because to do otherwise would betray the relative or friend, resulting in "endless repercussions within his family circle. 3 ' The monochronic client, left waiting, feels "put down,
angry, and frustrated.133 She expected that it was her turn.
Indeed, a North American's or North European's expectation
that, by waiting in line, he has secured his spot, can lead to disappointment in Latin America. Hall poses the example of the North
American bureaucrat stationed in Rio, who is instructed to get on
the next plane home due to an emergency. "He has an emergency
need to clear the country on three hours' notice, when Brazilian
'procedures' [cumbersome as they are] require three or more days.
Brazilians, of course, simply find a friend and bypass the procedures.13 ' Because polychronic cultures are oriented around relationships, rather than procedures, having an "insider friend" is
crucial .3 1 "A Latin American does not (cannot) simply act on the
abstract assumption that the individual who has been waiting in
line longest is more important than his friend. 3

A.

High and Low Context

According to Hall, monochronic cultures tend to be "low context," while polychronic cultures tend to be "high context.13 7 In
low-context communication, a speaker must spell out each step in
30. Hall, supra note 1, at 73.
31. Id. at 54.
32. Id. at 54-55.
33. Id. at 55.
34. Id. at 76-77.
35. See Hall, supra note 1, at 50; see also discussion infra Part WV.A. for how this
inward orientation is directly linked to corruption in Latin America.
36. Id. at 77.
37. See generally id. at 59-77.
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the inferential chain for his audience. She must give the necessary background; nothing can be taken for granted. High-context
communication assumes that the listener is already familiar with
the message's context. That is, it is taken for granted that the
listener already knows the background, and that he himself
makes necessary inferences. High-context communication often
occurs between husband and wife.
When he comes through the door after a day in the office,
she may not have to utter a word. He knows from the way
she moves what kind of day she had; he knows from her
tone of voice how she feels about the company they are
entertaining that night.3
It is not surprising that polychronic cultures tend to be highcontext. After all, they are based on relationships rather than
processes. "[Friendship takes a long time to develop; however,
once established, it persists and is not taken lightly."" The more
intimate the relationship between two people, the less they need
to spell out context.
Communication in the United States tends to be very low-context. "[I1ts roots [are] in European culture which dates back to
Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle [and] has built into its culture,
assumptions that the only natural and effective way to present
ideas is by means of a Greek invention called logic." 0 Logic is, by
its nature, the epitome of a low context system of thought. It
takes nothing for granted, carefully delineating each step necessary to arrive at a reasonable conclusion. British and United
States judicial philosophy revolves around logic. Court opinions
are a primary example."1
B.

Polychronic Organizations and Group Behavior

Polychronic time also shapes business structure and practices
in Latin America. Hall observed that because polychronic people
are heavily involved with one another, polychronic time systems
"[theoretically ... should demand a much greater centralization
of control and be characterized by a rather shallow or simple
structure. This is because the leader deals continually with many
38. Id. at 60.
39. Id. at 65.
40. Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3. for a comparison of the United States judicial
philosophy and the literalist approach taken by judges in Latin America.
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people, most of whom stay informed as to what is happening."
Hall noted that when something goes wrong in monochronic businesses, the automatic reaction is to look to the procedure itself."
Polychronic people immediately find out who was involved."
Furthermore, polychronic organizations "are limited in size,
they depend on having gifted people at the top, and are slow and
cumbersome when dealing with anything that is new or differ-

ent . 4 The result is higher transactional costs, especially in developing industries.
Hall also asserts that because polychronic businesses allow
employees to determine how and when they will perform their
functions, employees are constantly reminded that they are part
of the larger system . 4 1 On the other hand, in function-oriented
monochronic systems, employees have trouble conceptualizing
their compartmentalized activities as part of the "larger whole. 4
The notion that polychronic individuals tend to see the larger picture appears to be at odds with Lawrence Harrison's contention
that Latin American societies lack a sense of community, the
absence of which nurtures corruption.
IV.

POLYCHRONIC TIME AND CHALLENGES
FACING THE JUDICIARY

Like monochronic time systems, polychronic systems have
strengths and weaknesses. Cultures with high technologies-for
example, the Japanese-shift between systems depending upon
context.5 " In the legal context, though, strict polychronism can be
dangerous. The following analysis shows the hindering effect of
polychronism in Latin American legal proceedings.
In Rule of Law and Economic Efficiency, former Colombian
Minister of Law and Justice N6stor Humberto Martinez outlines
the shortcomings of the judiciary in Latin America."1 Each of
42. Hall, supra note 1, at 49.
43. Id. at 76.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 52.
46. This results in higher transactional costs, which presents a barrier to judicial
efficiency. See discussion infra Part IV.B3.1.
47. Hall, supra note 1, at 50-51.
48. Id.
49. Harrison, supra note 17, at 36. See discussion infra Part WV.A.
50. Hall, supra note 1, at 58.
51. See generally N6stor Humberto Martinez, Rule of Law and Economic

Efficiency, in

JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA

Jarqufn and Fernando Carrillo eds., 1998).

3 (Eclmundo
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these shortcomings fall under two broad judicial problems-( 1)
corruption and (2) inefficiency-each of which can be attributed to
polychronism.
A.

Corruption

The idea or proposition that "citizens will have their rights
respected""2 is at the core of virtually every justice system. But in
Latin America, the question is: whose rights are protected? Studies consistently show that in Brazil, for example, "citizens believe
that the justice system fundamentally exists to protect the powerful and that the police are not to be trusted."53 In fact, of 1566
killings over land disputes between 1964 and 1989, only seventeen
people were ever tried, and only eight were convicted.5 Of those
eight, "three cases involved priests, three involved lawyers, and
two involved national organizations coming to the defense of
indigenous peoples. 5
Therein lay the difficulties of polychronic cultures' orientation
toward people rather than processes and time. "In polychronic
countries, one has to be an insider or have a 'riend' who can make
things happen. All bureaucracies are oriented inward, but
Ilpolychronic] -type bureaucracies are especially so.""~ As such, citizens are patently distrustful of institutions in Latin America.
Table 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 illustrate citizens' perception of corruption,
judicial independence, and rule of law, respectively, across Latin
American countries.

52.

& ALFRED
175 (1996).

JuAN J. LINE

CONSOLIDATION

STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF D)EMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND

53. Id. at 175-76 (citing Rubens Figuiredo, Verdades e mitos sobre a cultura
brasileira, in OuviNo o BRASIL 95-115 (Lamounier, 1991)). Linz and Stepan
demonstrate this perception by reporting the results of a poll conducted in 1991 to a
national sample of 3600 respondents. Id. Eighty-four percent of Brazilians either
completely or partially agreed with the statement, "In Brazil the justice system only
functions to help the powerful." Id. at 176. Seventy-eight percent agreed with the
statement, "The police arrest and kill innocent people." Id.
54. Id. at 175.
55. Id. at 175-76.
56. Hall, supra note 1, at 50.
57. DataGov, http://www.iadb.orglDataGob/index.html (follow "Latin America &
the Caribbean" hyperlink; then choose "+" hyperlink for countries listed in table 1.1,
1.2 & 1.3 infra; then select the countries from "My Countries," then find the
corresponding indicators on the chart for "Rule of Law," "Corruption Perceptions
Index," and "Judicial independence") (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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1. 1

58
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX

Country

Value Year

Country

Value Year

High Income Countries

7.25

2008

Panama

3.4

2008

United States

7.3

2008

Guatemala

3.1

2008

Uruguay

6.9

2008

Dominican Republic

3

2008

Chile

6.9

2008

Bolivia

3

2008

Costa Rica

5.1

2008

Argentina

2.9

2008

Cuba

4.3

2008

Honduras

2.6

2008

El Salvador

3.9

2008

Nicaragua

2.5

2008

Colombia

3.8

2008

Paraguay

2.4

2008

Mexico

3.6

2008

Ecuador

2

2008

Peru

3.6

2008

Venezuela

1.9

2008

Brazil

3.5

20081

TABLE

1.2

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Country

Value Year

(WEF)5 9

Country

Value Year

Other (High Income)

5.53

2007

Honduras

3

2007

Costa Rica

5.1

2007

Panama

2.5

2007

Uruguay

4.8

2007

Bolivia

2.4

2007

Chile

4.2

2007

Peru

2.2

2007

Colombia

3.8

2007

Argentina

2.2

2007

Mexico

3.6

2007

Ecuador

2

2007

Dominican Republic

3.3

2007

Nicaragua

1.6

2007

Guatemala

3.3

2007

Paraguay

1.5

2007

El Salvador

3.1
3.1

2007
2007

Venezuela

1.2

2007

Brazil

58. "The (CPI) ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians." DataGov, supra note 57.
59. "Average responses of business executives surveyed to the following question
(using a scale of 1 to 7): The judiciary in your country is independent from political
influences of members of government, citizens or firms: 1 = no, heavily influenced; 7=
yes, entirely independent." DataGov, supra note 57.
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1.3

RULE OF LAW 60

Country

Value Year

Country

Value Year

Other (High Income)

1.32

2007

El Salvador

-0.68

2007

Chile

1.17

2007

Peru

-0.71

2007

Uruguay

0.49

2007

Cuba

-0.79

2007

0.44

Costa Rica

2007

Nicaragua

-0.84

2007

Panama

-0.2

2007

Honduras

-0.86

20071

Brazil

-0.44

2007

Bolivia

-0.96

2007

Argentina

-0.52

2007

Paraguay

-0.97

2007

Dominican Republic

-0.55 .2007

Ecuador

-1.04

2007

Colombia

-0.57

Guatemala

-1.11

2007

Mexico

-0.58 12007

Venezuela

-1.47 .2007

2007

These inward-oriented bureaucracies undercut the rule of
law. Consider contracts. In common law systems:
[Tlhe "law" is a permanent feature, one of our most important institutions. Contracts are sacred and binding because
they are backed by law. Yet a contract can be drawn up
overnight. In Latin America .. . only human relationships
are regarded as "permanent." . . .[T~he North American
businessman [by virtue of a contract] will assume quite
naturally that he has done everything he should to ensure
his economic survival in Latin America. Instead, he and
his company are a patchwork of vulnerabilities directly
traceable to failure to ensure the future by developing the
proper networks of friends in the right places."1
Marta Lagos theorizes that Latin American citizens'"very low
confidence in institutions" such as the judiciary stem from a general lack of interpersonal trust: "Survey data . . . confirm what
novelists and poets have long sensed and suggested: there is a
common regional heritage of distrust [in Latin America].*6 That
heritage is linked directly to Hall's observation that polychronic
60. "Combines in an aggregate index many of the available indicators of the rule of
law, including those dealing with the extent of property rights protection, the
enforceability of contracts, independence of the judiciary, effectiveness of the legal
system etc." DataGov, supra note 57.
61. Hall, supra note 1, at 67-68.
62. Marta Lagos, Latin America's Smiling Mask, 8 J. DEMOCRACY 125, 129 (1997)
(explaining that "no institution in any country enjoys a level of trust that is
significantly higher than the level of interpersonal trust in that country").
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societies place family and close friends "over everything else. 6
(Recall the example of the polychronic hairdresser who disregards
a customer's appointment time in order to "squeeze in"~ her relative.') According to Harrison, in Latin America, "trust is largely
confined to the family . .. . [and] those outside the family are..
In countries where people do not
outside a felt 'community."'
trust each other, how can they possibly trust the judiciary?
B.

Judicial Inefficiency
Distrust in the judiciary stems not only from the perception
that the judiciary is accessible only to certain socio-economic classes, but also from the inefficiency of judicial proceedings themselves. Table 1.4 shows Latin American business executives'
analysis of the efficiency of the legal framework in their respective
countries. 6 Presumably, a survey of non-business executive citizens would yield comparable, if not lower, perceptions of
efficiency.

63. Hall, supra note 1, at 54.
64. See discussion supra, Part III.
65. Harrison, supra note 17, at 36.
66. DataGov, Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/lindex.
html (follow "Latin America & the Caribbean" hyperlink; then choose "+" hyperlink
for countries listed in table 1.4; then follow "Rule of Law" tab; then find the
corresponding indicators on the chart for "Corruption Perceptions Index," "Judicial
independence," and "Efficiency of the legal framework") (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
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6

EFFICIENCY OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Name
Other (High Income)
United States
Chile
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Colombia
Honduras
Mexico
El Salvador
Guatemala
Brazil
Dominican Republic
Panama
Peru
Argentina
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Ecuador
Paraguay
Venezuela

Value
5.24
4.9
4.8
4.6
4.1
3.7
3.1
3.1
3
3
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.2
2.2
2
1.5

Year
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007

Several factors contribute to the lack of judicial efficacy in
Latin America, and are directly related to polychronic time. Each
of these factors, (1) increased transaction costs due to legislative
inflation, (2) slow judicial proceedings, and (3) the routine practice
of legal formalism, warrants an independent analysis.
67. "Average responses of business executives surveyed to the following question
(scale of [one] to [seven]): The legal framework in your country for private businesses
to settle disputes and challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations:
(1 = is inefficient and subject to manipulation; 7 = is efficient and follows a clear,
neutral process)." Id.

118
1.

18
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

Increased Transaction Costs Due to Legislative
Inflation

The ability of lawyers and judges alike to gain a grip on the
current law is crucial to the efficiency with which legal claims are
brought, litigated, settled, and enforced. Although the law is constantly changing in any society, at least some level of continuity is
necessary to maintain efficiency. After all, clients often pay for a
lawyer's particularized knowledge and experience in a specific
field: from labor law to tax law to probate to criminal law. That
prior knowledge cuts down on "transaction time," e.g., time spent
researching, determining the strength of a potential case, pleading a case, and of course, litigating or settling that case.
But in Latin America, transaction costs increase because judicial decisions are not always foreseeable . 68 Humberto Martinez
attributes the lack of foreseeability to "legislative inflation.""
Latin American governments "perceive that they need to expedite
the implementation of certain statutes, codes, and reforms" and,
"in the name of free market reforms, governments ...have rushed
to enact new legislation." 0 As a result, "the rules that regulate
business activity are in constant flux."7 ' In Colombia, for example,
such changes accounted for up to forty-five percent of GDP variations between 1954 and 1988.72
"This sort of legal uncertainty means that the most talented
entrepreneurs in society must dedicate themselves to studying

and evading the laws, rather than producing. 713 In other words,
attorneys and businessmen lose time in the process of adapting to
a constantly changing body of law.
Increased transaction time as a result of changing law must
increase more dramatically in polychronic systems. Recall that
polychronic organizations are "slow and cumbersome when dealing with anything that is new or different. 7 This is likely so
because of the polychronic tendency to focus on various tasks
simultaneously.
For example, in the case of a new regulation, a monochronic
68. Martinez, supra note 51, at 4.
69. Id. at 6 (internal quotes omitted).
70. Luz E. Nagle, On Armed Conflict, Human Rights, and Preserving the Rule of
Law in Latin America, 27 PENNm. ST. INT'L L. REV. 1, 12 (2008) (emphasis added).
71. Martinez, supra note 51, at 4.
72. Id. at 5 (citing M. Rubio, Crimen y crecimiento en Colombia, 25 Coyuntura
econ6mica 1 (1995)).
73. Id. at 6.
74. Hall, supra note 1, at 52.
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lawyer would likely allot a specific slot of time to the "task" of
learning the new law. Having learned it, she will move on to her
next task-applying it to all relevant cases. A polychronic attorney, on the other hand, would not view learning the law as a single, time-sensitive task. Rather, he would attempt to learn the
new regulation while simultaneously applying it to several relevant cases. He likely would work on a variety of unrelated tasks
all the while, thereby spreading the time necessary to adapt to the
regulation even further. In the long run, spreading the task of
learning the new law across multiple other activities will "cost"
the attorney time. Increased transaction time means increased
costs to the client, further limiting access to justice for poor
citizens.
2.

Slow Judicial Proceedings

In addition to increasing transaction time, polychronism further delays pleadings and judicial proceedings. "If the public
believes that judicial proceedings are burdensome and slow, statistics bear them out.""5 With the exception of Costa Rica and
Uruguay,"6 the average duration of civil disposition is exceedingly
long. In 1993, "the average times for disposition of cases in the
civil courts in Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela were 6.5 years,
7.9 years, and 8.4 years, respectively-an increase of eighty-five

percent since 198 1.17 Moreover, "there are long delays before
obtaining judgments against those who are accused of crimes.
Table 1.5 depicts the percentage of prison inmates who, between
1992 and 1995, had actually been charged with or convicted of a
crime in several Latin American countries.

75. Martinez, supra note 51, at 8.
76. These countries have undergone significant judicial reform. See
HALL ET AL.,
INDEPENDENCE

PROFESSIONAL

COURT

ADMINISTRATION:

THE

KEY

TO

DANIEL J.
JUDICIAL.

4, http://contentdm.ncsconline.orgcgibin/showfle.exe?CISOROOT= /
judicial&CISOPTR=204; see generally Bruce M. Wilson et al., The Best Laid Schemes
.. GangAft A-gley: JudicialReform in Latin America - Evidence from Costa Rica, 36
J. LAT. AMER. STUD.

507, 507-31 (2004).

77. Edgardo Buscaglia, Obstacles to JudicialReform in Latin America, in JUSTICE
DELAYED: JUDICIAL. REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 15, 18-19 (Edmundo Jarquin and
Fernando Carrillo ed., 1998).

120

LAW REVIEW
INTER-AMERICAN
20

[Vol. 41:1

TABLE 1.578
PERCENTAGE OF INMATE POPULATION
ACCUSED OR CONVICTED

Country
Argentina
Chile
Colombia
El Salvador
Panama
Paraguay
Uruguay
Venezuela

Percent
82.00
49.32
56.00
> 80.00
> 90.00
92.12
80.00
66.10

Years
1992
1993
1995
1993
1993
1994
1993
199

While these delays may be attributable to a multitude of factors-from lacking resources, to antiquated technology, to
increased "demand for court services," 9 something else must be at
work. In fact, a common remedy to the backlog of cases in Latin
America has been expansion of judges and judicial staff."0 The
number of judges per one hundred thousand people in Colombia,
Uruguay, Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Bolivia, Nicaragua,
Ecuador, Chile, and Guatemala, surpasses that of the United
Whereas there are two
States, Spain, and the Netherlands.
judges for every one hundred thousand people in the United
States, that number ranges from 3.0 in Guatemala to 17.1 in
Colombia. Notwithstanding the significantly higher ratio of
judges to population in Latin American countries, the backlog of
cases there has grown exponentially."
Polychronism, then, must play a role in these serious delays
to justice. For example, consider just some of the steps involved in
a civil action in the United States: pretrial negotiations, pretrial
discovery (similar to prueba anticipada, i.e. anticipatory proof, in
Latin American countries"), pleadings, motions, and trials. Like78. Martfnez, supra note 51, at 9 tbl.1.2 (reproduced).
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 10.
81. Id. at 11 tbl.1.6.
82. Id. at 8.
83. See Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: Development and Issues Over
the Past Seven Years, 35 U. Mi~mi INTER-Am. L. REV. 65, 91 (2003).
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wise, criminal proceedings include bond hearings, arraignments,
preliminary hearings or grand jury proceedings, pre-trial motions,
trials, sentencings, and sometimes, appeals. In the monochronic,
schedule-dominated culture of the United States, it is crucial that
attorneys, judicial staff, and parties comply with deadlines at each
of these stages. Indeed, the very nature of these stages is
monochronic. Each stage contributes to a larger process, and is
followed mechanically in every civil and criminal action.
Monochronic-time people work well with compartmentalized
tasks, strictly adhering to system-imposed, or even self-imposed
deadlines." In other words, monochronic time "is convenient in
linear operations""8 such as those involved in civil and criminal
proceedings. "In the West we organize our thinking, make plans,
theories, and designs for action; we calculate.""6
Can polychronic systems in Latin America equally adhere to
this process? In a culture in which time is abstract, punctuality is
less important, deadlines are flexible, and people engage in multiple activities simultaneously,"7 it is unlikely that legal actors operate with the same speed and sense of urgency as their
monochronic counterparts. The line separating business from personal tasks is blurred in polychronic cultures. 8 By contrast,
employees in capitalist societies "experience a distinction between
their employer's time and their 'own' time."" In polychronic
societies:
Social intercourse and labour are intermingled-the working-day lengthens or contracts according to the task-and
there is no great sense of conflict between labour and passing the time of day . . .. [T]o men accustomed to labour
timed by the clock, this attitude to labour appears to be
wasteful and lacking in urgency."0
When this "lack of urgency" causes delay at one stage of legal proceedings, it likely spills to the next, causing a domino effect that
84. See generally Hall, supra note 1, at 48-5 1.
85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. See generally id. at 44-77.
88. See generally id. ("[Plolychronic individuals are oriented toward people,
human relationships, and the family, which is the core of their existence. Family
takes precedent over everything else. Close friends come next. In the absence of
schedules, when there is a crisis, the family always comes first."). Id. at 54.
89. Thompson, supra note 15, at 61.
90. Id. at 60 (internal quotes omitted).
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could at least partially explain the enormous backlog of cases in
Latin America.
In polychronic cultures, "Em] atters . . . seem in a constant
state of flux. Nothing is solid or firm, particularly plans for the
future; even important plans may be changed right up to the minute of execution.""' A mutual understanding of this phenomenon
on the part of attorneys, judicial staff, and perhaps even judges,
could prove disastrous to expediency at the pre-litigation and litigation stage of any case. That is, because polychronic culture is
accepting of last-minute changes, the lawyer who receives notice
of such a change may passively acquiesce.9
Legal institutions are not immune to the polychronism apparent in Latin American culture. Signs of polychronic attitudes
among legal practitioners are evident as early as during law
school. David Ritchie, a professor at Mercer University School of
Law and adjunct faculty member at Escola da Magistratura
Regional Federal da 2a Regido in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, said that
law students and professors alike in Rio regularly arrive to class
up to an hour late.9 " "It is not considered rude, because there is
the mutual understanding that everyone will arrive at that
time."" Where this polychronic attitude is prevalent as early as
law school, its penetration into legal institutions is nearly
inevitable.
Indeed, a 1995 study of Argentine judges made evident their
polychronic tendency to engage in multiple activities simultaneously. According to the study, approximately seventy percent of
Argentine judges' time was spent on tasks unrelated to their
judgeship.95 Those figures stood at sixty-five percent in Brazil and
sixty-nine percent in Peru.9 " Similar surveys in Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina indicated that twenty to forty percent
of court staff interviewed "appear~ed] to be pleased to receive
administrative assignments, such as signing checks or ordering
office supplies."" Georgetown University Professor Edgardo Buscaglia has offered a possible explanation: it "may lie in the fact
91. Hall, supra note 1, at 47.
92. See discussion infra Part V.A. (analyzing Latin American citizens' passive
acquiescence to the legal status quo).
93. E-mail from David T. Ritchie, Professor, Mercer University School of Law
(Aug. 27, 2009, 14:52:00 EST) (on file with author).
94. Id.
95. Buscaglia, supra note 77, at 19.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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that administrative tasks give the judges a false sense of autonomy and planning capability. "'s
While that provides one explanation, polychronism may provide another. Given polychronic individuals' preference for engaging in more than one type of activity at once, it is only natural that
Argentine judges allot significant time to tasks that are outside
the apparent scope of their judgeship. While Hall does not
directly address the concept of focus, it lays at the heart of his
studies. It is possible that polychronic people's preference for
engaging in multiple activities creates an antipathy toward focusing exclusively on a single task. That antipathy, like polychronism as a whole, becomes engrained in their being. Such engrained
disinclination to focus on specific tasks undermines the efficiency
of the judiciary.
3.

Legal Formalism

A major obstacle to judicial efficiency in Latin America is that
the "law has become overlaid with an unnecessary degree of legal
formalism . . . ."" Most judge's "decisions are limited to reproducing the text of the law."' 00 With reference to legal formalism,
scholars have even said "that Latin American law is 'schizophrenic' in its doctrinaire reliance on formal legal categories.""0 '
Judges' literalist approach undoubtedly stems from Latin
America's civil law roots.
However, it also may relate to the high context of polychronic
culture. 02 Recall that low context communication in the United
States assumes "that the only natural and effective way to present
ideas is by means of a Greek invention called 'logic.' 103 Judicial
opinions delineate each logical step that judges take in order to
98. Id. (citing JESSE CASSAUS, COURT ADMINISTRATION IN LATIN AMERICA, Mimeo
(1994)).
99. Symposium, Law and Economic Development in Latin America: A
ComparativeApproach to Legal Reform, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 303 (2008); see
also Luis Pasara, Judicial Reform and Civil Society, in JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL.
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 83, 87 (Edmundo Jarquin and Fernando Carrillo ed., 1998)
(noting a prevailing legal culture in Latin America marked by "strict adherence to
legal form and the letter of the law that is reflected in the actions of most of our
judicial officers").
100. Pasara, supra note 99, at 87 (quoting M. Sdnchez Palacios, Formaci6n y
capacitaci6n de magistrados, in NuEvAs

PERSPECTIVAS PARA LA REFORMA INTEGRAL DE
LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA EN EL PERU (Ministry of Justice, 1994)).

101. Symposium, supra note 99, at 303.
102. See discussion supra Part lIIIA.
103. Hall, supra note 1, at 63.
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arrive at their holding. Sometimes, judges utilize creative logic in
order to justify the most equitable ends. But in Latin America,
[Judges] refus[e] to interpret the law, opting instead for a
literalist approach. Many judges think that the law does
not need to be interpreted, as it has only one possible meaning. By considering themselves as mere enforcers, judges
renounce ab initio any responsibility to introduce innovations and creativity into the law in deciding cases.'04
This refusal to use a system of logic as a means of arriving at equitable decisions is, at least in part, directly attributable to high
context, polychronic communication, in which a speaker need not
explain each step in the inferential chain. As such, failure to
employ low context logic undermines judicial efficiency.

V.

RHYHM

At first blush, it seems difficult to reconcile judicial inefficiency with Hall's observation that employees in polychronic businesses are constantly aware that they are part of the larger
system. 105 Where an individual employee is mindful of his or her
importance to the ultimate success of a company-or for the present purposes, to the success of the legal system-one would
assume that the employee would work diligently and quickly so as
to maximize the efficiency of his or her function. That assumption
overlooks mutual human rhythm, or as Hall puts it, "the dance of
life. 106
It can now be said with assurance that individuals are dominated in their behavior by complex hierarchies of interlocking rhythms. Furthermore, these same interlocking
rhythms are comparable to fundamental themes in a symphonic score, a keystone in the interpersonal processes
between mates, co-workers, and organizations. ... Rhythm
is, of course, the very essence of time, since equal intervals
of time define a sequence of events as rhythmic.'
People within groups are connected to each other by a rhythm
that is common to that group, and to their larger society. After
conducting extensive studies of homemade films, in which he
recorded people in public spaces, Hall determined that rhythm
locks people together in "a dance which function [s] almost totally
104.
105.
106.
107.

Pasara, supra note 99, at 88.
See supra text accompanying note 47.
See generally Hall, supra note 1, at 153-76.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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outside awareness."'
This was true of both polychronic and
monochronic cultures."'0
In one experiment, Hall's student filmed children playing in a
schoolyard during recess."0 "[Watching the film several times at
different speeds . .. he began to notice one very active little girl
who seemed to stand out from the rest.""' Whenever the girl
approached a cluster of children, their movements became in sync
with each other's and with hers."12 "Many viewings later, he realized that this girl, with her skipping and dancing and twirling,
was actually orchestrating movements of the entire
playground!""13
The "beat" to which the children were moving was "part of a
shared culture.""' Likewise, the beat to which members of
monochronic societies move is part of their culture. Imagine the
fast-paced rhythm of a county courtroom in a metropolitan region
of the United States. Each judicial staff member is part of a welloiled machine. Dozens of attorneys, clerks, court reporters, and
other judicial staff hustle to quickly make headway through the
morning docket. One by one, each of dozens of defendants takes
his turn. State attorneys furiously sift through files; public
defenders scramble to speak with their clients; clerks hastily set
hearing times; and judges monotonously recite to defendants their
rights, signing orders all the while. It is not a coincidence that
everyone moves at the same fast pace. Rather, each actor follows
a core rhythm that unites them all.
It makes sense, then, that judicial staff in polychronic societies might fail to adopt a monochronic-style efficiency in completing their tasks. Although they see the larger picture,"15 they
naturally work pursuant to the protracted rhythm of their colleagues, and to the rhythm of their society's general polychronic
culture.

A.

Challenges to Reform: "Subject" Culture and
Citizen's Lack of Political Inertia

Rhythm also might explain why citizens lack political inertia
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 154.
See generally id. at 153-76.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 170.
See generally id. at 50-5 1.
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in many Latin American countries. Judicial reform hinges on
political activity by citizens from all social sects. "While politicians play a crucial role in giving impetus to the judicial reform
process, political parties should not be the only social actors
involved.""' 6 In many Latin American countries, the "common citizen [is] passive and disorganized with respect to the justice sysjudicial
tem.""' 7 Paradoxically, a lack of "social demand for
reform . ...is key in maintaining the current state of affairs. 1
In Latin America's Smiling Mask, Marta Lagos distinguishes
between "citizen" culture and "subject" culture. 1 ' Whereas the
former is characterized by "active participation in the political
process," the latter-which applies to most of Latin America- "is
characterized by a passive acceptance of the political system.""'
According to Lagos, Latin Americans have developed a tendency
"to remain silent regarding their true feelings and intentions, and
to emphasize appearances .. .- the twin progeny of distrust-. .. .
[lOctavio] Paz describes this attitude as a 'smiling mask.'"121 The
passivism that Lagos describes continues because of rhythm. Perhaps, because citizens are on the same protracted rhythm as the
judiciary, they do not mind the slow and cumbersome judicial process. Perhaps they "dance" with the judiciary, and one another, to
a passive beat.
...

VI.

CONCLUSION

Hall observed that generally, neither monochronic nor
polychronic time is superior to the other, each carrying strengths
and weaknesses. 2 2 However, in the specific context of the justice
system, monochronism is essential to developing a reliable, efficient, and independent judiciary. Hall's work, fortunately, offers
hope that judicial reform is capable of surmounting the challenges
that polychronism. poses to the Latin American judiciary. Accord116. Pasara, supra note 99, at 92.
117. Id. at 93.
118. Id.
119. Lagos, supra note 62, at 130.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 126.
122. Indeed, Hall's discovery that polychronic: individuals are disproportionately
more in tune with others' rhythms, emotions, and moods, see supra note 24, could lay
the grounds for a completely independent research project on polychromc jurors'
ability to "read" witnesses to a proceeding. Additionally, Hall's observation that
"friendship takes a long time to develop" in polychroaic cultures could shed light on
effective attorney-client and attorney-jury communication in Latin America and
Latino-populated regions of the United States. Id.
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ing to Hall, monochromic time is learned."' 3 Where an attitude is
learned, it can be taught, and with enough training, adopted. But
adoption of monochronism in the judiciary requires more than
mere training; it calls for a radical change in deeply engrained
rhythms of polychronism. Radical, but not impossible. Mfter all, if
one little girl can coordinate an entirely new tempo in a schoolyard playground, a mass movement can surely orchestrate a
monochronic symphony in the Latin American judiciary.

123. Hall, supra note 1, at 48.

